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Introduction 
 
The conservative "revolutions" of the early 1980s have been identified with the promotion of 
what has been termed "deregulation." This term is often associated with the structural change of 
a regulatory regime. It implies a decline in government regulation, the diffusion of decision 
making, and the minimalist state. Deregulation also generally denotes a market strategy of 
economic development. As a result, deregulation is associated with the liberalization of 
economic practices, privatization of industry, and less state intervention in the economy in order 
to encourage entrepreneurs. 
 
This chapter focuses on the deregulation of the German telecommunications industry. During the 
1980s, the Federal Republic of Germany underwent a vast restructuring of the regulatory regime 
for telecommunications. This case of deregulation is interesting because it is in stark contrast to 
the structural changes usually associated with deregulation. In the German telecommunications 
sector, deregulation actually lead to a more centralized and integrated regulatory structure. It will 
be asserted that the transformation of the regulatory regime resulted from changes in the global 
market for communication technologies, technological innovation in the field of 
telecommunications, and the political strategy of the conservative government to exploit these 
changes to leverage alterations within the existing decentralized regime. By emphasizing the 
national government's role in developing and maintaining "infrastructure," decision making 
power over telecommunications was effectively removed from the hands of the Länder (state) 
governments. 
 
On the most general theoretical level, we will challenge the idea that "deregulation" indicates an 
"absence" or "decline" in regulation. In the instance of German telecommunications, this was 
clearly not the case. Our case study indicates the development of a new regulatory regime in 
place of the old one. In Germany, deregulation did not even represent a “decentralization" of 
power in the telecommunication sector. Deregulation actually led to consolidating policy making 
power on the national level. Thus, we concluded that "deregulation" implies no specific 
structural alteration, centralization, or decentralization of regulatory practice. The strategy will 
always be "context specific." 
 
If deregulation does not imply a specific structural alteration, does this mean that deregulation is 
synonymous with "marketization?" Our claim is that the term "marketization" is simply not 
complex enough to include the multifaceted nature of deregulation. . 
 
We contend that the structural changes in the German telecommunications sector can be 
subsumed under a more general terminology. Specifically, we believe that what occurred in the 
German telecommunication sector represents a shift from public, pedagogical norms to 
"performance" norms. Performance norms, in the sense that Lyotard (I984) and Luhmann (I969), 
refer to them, constitute an organizational strategy designed to increase market competitiveness, 
develop administrative efficiency and competence, and enhance the quantity of "product" 
available for consumption. As a result, "performance" also builds up regime legitimacy by 
enhancing competence and control, potentially contributing to employment possibilities, plus 
increasing the total quantity of goods available for consumption. But even though "performance" 
has economic implications, it is not a derivative of liberal market ideology. It represents a much 
broader cultural context than is denoted in modem liberal ideology. 
 
In German telecommunications, adopting "performative" norms has resulted in a significant step 
toward more centralization of administrative authority, a significant increase in private 
telecommunications, and a great deal more telecommunication options available for 
consumption. This result represents the undoing of a consciously constructed strategy in the 
federal constitution. One can predict that this will have a long-term impact on German political 
culture. 
 
 
Deregulation as a "Performative" Strategy 
 
"Deregulation" is a term that defies clear theoretical explanation. This is the case because it can 
be applied to numerous practices in the political arena. As Hancher and Moran (I 989) suggest, 
deregulation can mean the end to a rulemaking structure or it can be applied to the practice of 
structural or rule alteration. A theory of deregulation is also problematic since there is no 
singular goal that it seeks to achieve. In some cases, deregulation may be 'oriented to a 
substantive political end, such as the diffusion of political power in the quest for a minimalist 
state. In other cases, the ends may be of a more instrumental nature, such as the desire to 
promote employment and industrial growth by diminishing the "red tape" involved in business 
practices. It should not be assumed, as is often the case that the substantive and instrumental 
goals are mutually reinforcing. Such assumptions exist only on the level of ideology. 
 
Further complicating a clear theoretical definition of "deregulation" is the fact that it is often 
associated with the Reagan/Thatcher style of liberalism that was reflected in the rhetoric of the 
1980s. Reagan, Thatcher, and to some extent Helmut Kohl, spoke of the benefits of 
privatization, unimpeded market forces, and a minimum of regulatory interference in the 
economy. This clearly left the impression that deregulation was associated with liberal market 
ideology. However, there is a problem with this association. If deregulation represents a process 
of marketization, reflecting liberal ideology, then why is deregulation also the strategy adopted 
by the socialist regimes in France and Spain (Dyson and Humphreys, 1989, p. 141)? 
Deregulation of the telecommunication sector has become common practice across the 
European Community by both conservative and socialist governments. 
 
Finally, deregulation is often ambiguous since it is mistakenly used to describe a "restructuring" 
of the regulatory regime that governs a particular policy area. This use of the term does not imply 
a decline in overall regulatory oversight, but an alteration of the decision making structure 
through which administrative power flows. Referring to this structural alteration as deregulation 
is a result of looking at the disintegration of old structures, rather than accounting for the 
formation of a new regulatory regime. As Hancher and Moran correctly point out, the paradox of 
the "rule cancellation" definition of deregulation is that it is generally simply a prelude to 
reregulation (Hancher and Moran, 1989). 
 
It is in this context that the reregulation of the German telecommunications industry must be 
understood. The deregulation of telecommunications took place within the regulatory regime in 
which decision making power was dominated by the Länder . In that context, deregulation 
represented a breakdown of the equilibrium that maintained the system in the post- WWII era. 
But this regulatory breakdown was accompanied by the creation of a new regulatory regime at 
the national level, the legitimacy of which was granted by the constitutional court's ruling in 
1986. This decision delineated the end of the old regime and the beginning of the new one. 
 
However, this reregulation represented more than an alteration in the flow of power within the 
FRG. This change also illustrated a paradigm shift in the telecommunications sector. As Dyson 
and Peter assert, broadcasting in Europe, generally, has a "public service" orientation (Dyson and 
Humphreys, 1989). Today, however, "[t]he concept of telecommunications and broadcasting as 
'public goods' that require stringent controls is giving way to a market model of provision." This 
is particularly true of Germany, where the "entertainment" function of broadcasting had 
traditionally been subordinated to the "information" and "education" functions.  
 
But the restructuring of the regulatory regime in German telecommunications legitimated more 
than the "market." In allowing the growth of a private, competitive telecommunications sector, 
the court also legitimated the shift to "performance" measures in an area of German culture from 
which they had previously been excluded. As Niklas Luhmann claims, "in postindustrial society, 
the normative values are replaced by the performance of procedures" (Luhmann, 1969). Setting 
priorities within the telecommunication sector constitutes the construction of a "normative 
regime." It was the normative structure governing telecommunications that was most 
fundamentally altered by the reregulation. 
 
 
 
Telecommunications and Regulatory Competence 
 
According to Scharpf (1976), the most significant element of German federalism is that above 
the decentralized decision making units (states, local communities, etc.) exists a central 
institution (the national government) that represents the general public and is empowered to 
formulate and decide on a political program. Though this central unit is dependent on 
information provided by the subunits, it does not necessarily depend on their approval. 
 
In telecommunications, the situation was different before 1986. The telecommunications industry 
had been consciously decentralized in the post-WWII period. According to the constitution, 
states are supposed to be the driving, decisive force in media politics. Decentralization was 
achieved by dividing the areas of competency over telecommunications. The federal constitution 
implicitly distinguishes between the development and maintenance of "infrastructure" and 
competence over policy that regulates the production, content, and funding of media broadcasts. 
The federal government's role was to develop and administer the infrastructure for 
telecommunications. Individual Länder governments were to regulate the organization, 
financing, and content of programming. 
 
The Federal Postal Administration (OBP) administers this function and is responsible for the 
technical infrastructure of radio and TV (cable, transmitter, satellites, etc.). The legislative 
powers of the federal government cover primarily the regulation of "frame conditions" (antitrust 
law, foreign relations, protection of minors and consumers in general, regulation of advertising, 
etc.). In accordance with the jurisdiction of the federal constitutional court, the states should 
make the fundamental decisions about the structure of the media system; the federal government 
(especially the OBP) is supposed to follow the states' guidelines. In this chapter, we refer to the 
OBP and its legitimating statute as it was before the reorganization of 1989. 
 
DBP's monopoly of the technical infrastructure is guaranteed by the German constitution. 
Although the OBP is not part of the government apparatus, but a public enterprise 
(Sondervermögen), there is a minister for posts and telecommunications. Self-imposed decrees 
(not laws) regulate the OBP; furthermore, the parliament does not control the DBP budget. (This 
has changed with the 1989 reorganization. Now, this ministry is comparable to a regulatory 
agency.) 
 
The Federal Postal Administration has been split into three semi-independent corporations with 
special management structures. Thus, the Federal Postal Administration controls all types of 
electronic communications, including most radio and TV transmitters, cable systems, and 
satellites. 
 
With regard to content and regulation, however, the German constitution does not give the 
federal government significant legislative powers over the media. Traditionally, radio and TV 
were considered "cultural" affairs and culture is one of the few areas in which the states 
preserved substantial legislative rights. In 1981, the Federal Constitutional Court stated that the 
Länder, not the federal government or private bodies, must ensure that programming is generally 
balanced and reflects the existing diversity of public opinion. 
 
Accordingly, each state decreed its own broadcasting law and assembled its own supervisory 
body for public broadcasting. All issues affecting more than one state must be settled by 
unanimous agreements between the heads of those states. Major controversies about the extent of 
political influence exercised on the media were settled by court decisions in 1961, 1971, 1981, 
and 1986. 
 
As a result, this system produced a situation in Germany that is quite different from that of other 
European states. While in most European countries, the majority of programs come from the 
capital or at least from the economic centers, the bulk of public German programming is 
produced by the nine independent public broadcasting corporations (Ländesrundfunkanstalten). 
Each Ländesrundfunkanstalt is in charge of its own (regional) radio program (currently aired on 
three to five channels each). Each Ländesrundfunkanstalt is controlled by a "broadcasting 
council" (Rundfunkrat). The Ländesrundfunkanstalten are organized by the Association of Public 
Broadcasting Corporations of Germany (ARD). As a whole, the ARD system is highly 
decentralized. 
 
In summary, the traditional media structure which evolved after World War II was characterized 
by cultural norms that sought to isolate the media from both political pressures and intensive 
commercialization. This was perceived to be the best protection against overt state control of 
radio and TV as well economically powerful elites. Radio and TV were to be funded primarily 
by fees collected from users; limited advertisement was a secondary means of financing the 
programs. This began to change in the 1980s as technical changes and increasing competitive 
pressures from outside forced Germany to reassess the situation. 
 
 
Technical Innovation and Regime Change in the 1980s 
 
Looking at the media politics from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the dominant feature seems 
to be the impact of new technological developments. Without these new developments, 
discussions about deregulation, privatization, and the future of the public broadcasting system 
would hardly have occurred with such fervor. These technical changes include direct broadcast 
satellites, communications satellites, coaxial cable, and fiber optic cable. All of these are in 
addition to the interest private broadcasters expressed in expanding the existing use of air wave 
broadcasting. These technical developments helped to radically change the traditional media 
structure. By the late 1970s, it had become clear that the technology existed to dramatically 
increase the available programming in the FRO. What had not been clear in the late 1970s was 
whether or not the German government and citizens desired this expansion. 
 
The range of policy options for the single states in the 1970s, given their ample regulatory 
powers, was manifold. Already in 1974, the Federal Postal Administration asked the Länder to 
develop plans about the future use of cable radio and TV and of additional satellite capacities. 
However, the Länder did not act. Despite the lack of constitutionally required guidelines, the 
Federal Postal Administration gradually acquired satellite capacities and promoted cabling, thus 
limiting the Länders' future actions. The DBP claimed competency for planning and 
implementing telecommunication satellites since those are purely technical "subjects" and, 
therefore, fall under their jurisdiction (the states never seriously challenged this point). 
 
The political agenda changed dramatically when the newly formed conservative-liberal federal 
government came into office in 1982. The new administration made systematic media 
restructuring atop priority. Now, the DBP was used as an instrument to construct a new 
infrastructure for private competitors. The big emphasis put on constructing new media 
infrastructures then forced the states to act. At this point, the conservative-liberal coalition in the 
federal government demanded the development of uniform state media laws, an end to the 
"aggressive" behavior of public radio and TV institutions in the market, subsidies for private 
broadcasting corporations, no regulation of advertisement in private broadcasting programs, no 
increase in advertising space in the public media, and state support for the construction of 
technical infrastructure to which would primarily benefit private enterprises. 
 
In most cases, the federal government has no real power to enact regulations in these fields. But 
the pressure to neglect states' rights was overwhelming, especially given the hesitant role of the 
Länder . Without consulting the states, the federal minister of posts and telegraphs acquired a 
number of satellite channels. However, the minister was not legally entitled to sell or rent them 
to radio or TV stations (be they private or public) because this was a clear responsibility of the 
states. Since a satellite covers more than one (if not several) state, the Länder  had to come to a 
uniform decision on the distribution of satellite channels. Normally, a state treaty coordinates 
policy among different states. This requires a unanimous vote from the heads of state 
governments and approval from all state parliaments. Given the fact that until 1982, private radio 
and TV did not exist in Germany, the distribution of satellite channels proved to be a difficult 
issue for the states to resolve. 
 
At the beginning, a consensus existed that something had to be done. But how to react was hotly 
debated. There was a sharp line of division between the Länder governed by a Social 
Democratic Party (SPD)/Green Party coalition and by those governed by a conservative-liberal 
coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP). The CDU/CSUIFDP favored private stations, whereas the SPD wanted 
to protect the public media structure. Specifically, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition demanded a 
freeze on advertising in the public media, no further possibility to expand the public media, and 
favorable conditions for the private competitors (e.g., state subsidies). In a compromise offer, 
the SPD declared that it would admit the legitimate role of private TV and radio, but they 
demanded guarantees for the further existence and development of public broadcasting. 
As the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition worked toward compromise, conflicts arose among the states. 
The old centers of the media industry were situated in the north (e.g., Hamburg). So, even the 
northern SPD-governed states favored a benevolent attitude toward private competitors. But 
other states sought to assure their share of the expected jobs and profits. States began to compete 
for the expanding industry by offering subsidies to private corporations. This situation was 
further exacerbated by the emerging conflict between the Ländesrundfunkanstalten and the 
minister presidents. Even the Ländesrundfunkanstalten that were headed by members of the 
conservative parties favored guarantees for the further existence and development of the public 
media. 
 
To reach a solution, the states would have had to coordinate their policies. Such a practice 
proved to be too difficult because of the political and economic pressures placed on the states. If 
the states' decision-making system is blocked in such a way that they cannot make decisions, the 
states are left to belatedly adopt the DBP's policies. As a result, the DBP began to perform the 
steering function assigned to the states. The DBP was (and is still) able to pursue such policies 
because of the states' organizational deficiencies and their lengthy decision-making procedures. 
The states were simply not able to adapt to the performance imperative now being forced on 
them. 
 
 
The Search for Structural Reform 
 
In February 1973, the federal government appointed the Independent Commission for the 
Development of the Telecommunications System (KtK/1974-76) (Hornet, 1979). In January 
1976, the ministry of posts and telegraphs presented their six-volume "Telecommunications 
Report" to the public. The report recommended that states address the issue of additional 
programs and their impact on developing the broadcasting infrastructure and advocated 
developing guidelines for a national broadband cable network with a maximum capacity of 30 
TV channels. 
 
International events also changed the telecommunications environment. In January 1977, 100 
nations reached an international agreement in Geneva on the location of satellite orbits and the 
frequencies to be used. On April 29, 1980, the German and French governments signed a 
contract to construct two DBS satellites: TV -SA T and TDF. 
 
The conservative-governed states intended to let private organizers use the new technologies. 
States governed by social democrats insisted that the new technologies should be the domain of 
the public organizations. The formula for a temporary compromise was found in 1978. Based on 
a recommendation of the minister presidents in 1978, four pilot projects experimented with the 
new technological and organizational options. (However, the project in Ludwigshafen was the 
only one in which private organizations initially gained access.) 
 
But the conflict was not resolved. By 1982, the states agreed on only one issue: the federal 
government's attempts to restrict state competencies should be resisted. In early 1982, the 
minister presidents asked the broadcasting commission to formulate a report on the system's 
future development, emphasizing the role and impact of private broadcasting companies. Then, 
the minister presidents still hoped private and public media corporations would cooperate. 
During 1983, this proved to be futile. The private firms were not willing to have their potential 
development restricted by agreements with the public broadcasting corporations. 
 
This affected the consultations of the minister presidents. In 1984, for the first time, the minister 
presidents unanimously accepted a role for private corporations. One channel on the 
communication satellite ECS was granted to a German-based consortium. A decision on the use 
of the satellite capacities of the ECS was absolutely necessary because the it was ready to operate 
and the Federal Postal Administration and the federal government had invested large sums of 
money in the project. They were not willing to accept any major delays involving a substantial 
loss of revenues. 
 
By October 1984, the minister presidents agreed on the first all-embracing strategy for the 
Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens. The compromise was hailed as a clear victory for the private 
organizers and a severe defeat for the public broadcasting system. The compromise was based on 
the coexistence of public and private broadcasting corporations. It granted the operation of 
private broadcasters, but demanded that they operate under the states' regulatory structure. The 
public broadcasting system was guaranteed its further existence and development, including 
future participation in satellite broadcasting. The old structure for financing public broadcasting 
remained. Programs had to be primarily financed out of fees. Advertising time was not to be 
extended. Private corporations had few limitations on advertising except not to exceed 20% of 
the daily broadcasting time. Advertising could now continue 24 hours a day, even on Sundays 
and holidays. In addition to working out a regulatory compromise, a strategy for using the 
satellites "Intelsat" and "TV Sat" was developed. 
 
The SPD party executives reluctantly supported this compromise. However, within the SPD, 
resistance began to grow in the state and federal parliaments. Due to opposition from the public 
broadcasting system, churches, and trade unions, the SPD finally demanded improvements in the 
compromise. Specifically, they wanted a guarantee of plurality within the private corporations 
(Binnenpluralität), measures against developing regional monopolies (newspapers and 
broadcasting), quotas and promoting domestic (cultural) productions, and limitations on 
advertising. 
 
A new compromise looked promising in the beginning of December 1984. But at the next 
meeting of the minister presidents, the compromise was lost. Again, fundamental questions 
concerning the balance between the existence and further development of public broadcasting 
and the creation of favorable conditions for private organizers could not be answered. 
 
To clarify the SPD's position and avoid further disturbances among party members, the so-called 
Diisseldoifer Erklärung spelled out a new Social Democratic compromise. The main feature of 
this strategy was the inclusion of new advertising possibilities for public broadcasting. Reacting 
to this proposal, the conservative minister presidents formulated their own ideas which included 
participation of private corporations in the fees collected for the public system, participation of 
the private corporations in newly collected fees, and a constitutional challenge to the extension 
of advertising in the public system. Then, in a series of talks, the individual minister presidents 
discussed different possible options. But real solutions were impossible. 
 
The inability of the states to formulate a common regulatory policy proved disadvantageous to 
the development of a strong, competitive, telecommunications sector. Meanwhile, external 
pressures grew. Technical innovation continued, with increasing standardization through 
international treaties. In addition, the EC continued to push for EC-wide telecommunication 
policies. The decentralized structure had been organized for educational, political, and cultural 
reasons that increasingly inhibited administrative, economic, and technical performance. Only a 
new regulatory regime could alter this condition. 
 
 
The Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court 
 
The problem-solving capacity of the Federal Constitutional Court with regard to broadcasting 
proved to be remarkable in the past. In virtually no other country has the development of the 
broadcasting system been so intensively shaped by court decisions as in the FRG. For decades, 
the court preserved a German (and European) tradition of public broadcasting. It has repeatedly 
supported the idea that the media are a "public good" in the sense that they inform, educate, and 
represent varied and unique cultural norms. Prior to 1986, the court had expressed the position 
that the media performed a necessary and important function in a free and open society, a role 
too important to be left to the market. Thus, the 1986 and 1987 decisions were the last in a series 
of important rulings. 
 
On November 4, 1986, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) legitimated the emerging regime 
in telecommunications. An SPD faction in the federal parliament appealed to the court to declare 
the new media law of Lower Saxony unconstitutional to set a precedent for other state 
broadcasting laws. Thus, the SPD intended to have the court build barriers against a thorough 
commercialization of broadcasting. But in its final ruling, the SPD did not get all it hoped for. 
 
The court did not declare the law as a whole unconstitutional. Instead, the court revised some of 
its previous opinions. Parts of the law were ruled unconstitutional. But more important than this 
verdict was the justification for the decision. The court held that broadcasting is a special case 
that cannot be subject to pure market calculations. The court stated that the interests of 
minorities, cultural standards, and balanced information cannot be guaranteed within a purely 
market-oriented system. On the other hand, the court recognized the political and economic 
pressures to introduce private broadcasting corporations. 
Had the court's precedent been maintained, it would have concluded that the private broadcasters 
would not be permitted to operate. However, the court was asked to make a ruling in a climate in 
which private broadcasters had already established a foothold; their existence could no longer be 
denied. In its decision, the court stuck to some of its essential positions from previous rulings, 
but it finally could not close its eyes when confronted with the new technological, economic, and 
political realities. 
 
The proposed solution proposed was to construct a dual system. The proposal included a public 
system with the traditional standards and control requirements and a private system under some 
public control, but far less regulated than the public sector. Private programs have only to fulfill 
minimum standards for balanced information. Media monopolies are discouraged, but the private 
broadcasters' amortization of invested capital is encouraged. In this case, the court obviously 
considered foreign experiences that showed how difficult it is to regulate private broadcasting. 
 
In its ruling, the court established guarantees for the survival of the public media. Only if the 
public media survived would the private media be "constitutionally" permitted. The market 
criteria that directs private broadcasting is only allowed to operate as long as the public 
broadcasting corporations are able to fulfill their role for politische Willensbildung (forming the 
political will) which is its klassischen Auftrag (classical task). In theory, this connection means 
that if the public system falls, the private one will, too. 
 
The court ruling represented a fundamental shift in the basic logic behind broadcasting 
regulations. The German (as well as other European countries') broadcasting system was 
constructed to serve a public constituency with programming that, in principle, sought to 
enhance the normative ideal of creating an "informed electorate." The federal court, seeking to 
balance this principle with broadcasting industry performance pressures, essentially ended this 
commitment. The public system's existence may be guaranteed, but commitment to the 
nonnative principle that directed broadcasting regulation has been negated. 
 
 
Structures of the New Regulatory Regime 
 
At the next conference of the minister presidents, a working group reported on the different 
possible interpretations of the FCC's ruling and worked out options for decision making. 
Following an initiative of the Social Democrats that was based on this report, they reached a 
compromise in March 1987. It guaranteed the further existence and development of the public 
system, a balanced distribution of satellite channels, income for public corporations by regularly 
raised fees, and a precise definition of what happens with the collected fees. 
 
To regulate the private system, a whole new bureaucracy had to be developed, financed by fees 
collected from public radio and TV users. The observers believed this created the most extended 
media bureaucracy of all democratic states. Instead of guaranteeing competition in the private 
sector, the German media now contains both private and public monopolies. 
 
Federal policies further eroded the power of the Länder over telecommunications. The Federal 
Postal Administration was reorganized in 1989. The newly created Deutsche Bundespost 
Telecom is supposed to work as a market-oriented enterprise. Therefore, its decisions can only 
be very indirectly influenced by the Länder. In addition, there were a number of federal 
initiatives at the EC level. On the EC level, the federal government (but not the Länder) can 
influence the decision-making process. Also, the federal government's 1989 directive, 
"Television without Frontiers" (against the protests of the Länder) furthered the shift in decision 
making. Finally, after reunification, the restructuring of the East German broadcasting system 
provided an opportunity for the federal government to expand its sphere of influence at the 
expenses of the states (both old and new). The fate of broadcasting from now on was to be 
decided with the explicit and active participation of the federal government. 
 
On August 3, 1991, the new state treaty on broadcasting for unified Germany was prepared with 
the active participation of the federal government. The Länders' ability to regulate programming 
has correspondingly declined. Emerging administrative structures formalize that transferred 
decision-making power. 
 
 
The Search Concluded: Liberal Ideology, Market Pressure, or Party Politics 
 
The 1980s, the decade during which the new electronic media were heavily debated, were not 
directed by any coherent media policy. Even though high-level commissions studied the state of 
affairs, they could not make broad recommendations. To do so would have placed them in the 
middle of the confrontation between the leading parties (CDU versus SPD) and economic 
interests (business versus trade unions). In many ways, the lengthy process that finally led to the 
state treaty has been similar to other structural reforms. But this case has its peculiarities, too. 
More than in other cases (and partly due to the long time that was needed to find a compromise), 
policy priorities were not set by the states but by the Federal Postal Administration, the courts, 
and economically powerful interest groups. In the absence of a broad consensus on the part of 
the states, these alternative actors took the initiative. 
 
Originally, media policies were considered to be affairs for the states because they primarily 
dealt with "culture." Media regulations were directed according to substantive public values such 
as "balanced information" and exposing people to diverse opinions and lifestyles. There was also 
concern about the negative effects of advertising in TV and radio. Generally, however, education 
had always been considered the primary role of the media. 
 
This changed drastically in Germany since the 1986 ruling. Broadcasting regulation problems are 
no longer cultural, but economic. Here is the rationale for transferring state legislative powers to 
the federal government. The states, themselves, participated in this development. In the different 
new state media laws, few "cultural" elements remain. The state ministers of culture and 
education have had little influence on the state treaty. This fact proves that other interests 
(political and economic) were behind the change. This might be fatal for state influence. With 
the primary issues of regulation now "economic" and with the federal government possessing 
legislative powers in that area, the states' power to regulate broadcasting has been effectively 
diminished. It is unlikely that the states will ever have the opportunity to recapture that power. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we have attempted to show, in the German telecommunications system, deregulation did not 
mean an end to regulatory oversight, but rather the formation of a new regulatory regime in 
which the dominant power to make policy was moved from the Länder to the federal 
administration. This transformation resulted from the internationalization of telecommunication 
markets, the development of new technologies, and European Union pressures for standard-
ization and technical development. All of these represent "performance" pressures to which the 
federal government felt a need to respond. This pressure found fertile soil in the CDU/CSU 
which perceived mistreatment at the hands of what it considered Rotfunk (Red broadcasting). 
 
The shift in regulatory power has been achieved by transforming the discourse that dominated 
broadcasting in the post-WWII decades. Focusing on the performance potential of 
"infrastructure," the federal government has eroded state controls over broadcasting. The result 
has been a paradigmatic shift in the norms that govern broadcast media. In the past, discussions 
about the broadcasting system were never dominated by economic considerations and market 
arguments. Now, broadcasting has a performance value that is directed according to international 
and domestic market concerns, technical development, and administrative effectiveness. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that "deregulation" is not associated with liberal ideology, the 
substantive end of the minimal state, or even a strict market ideology. Deregulation means 
adopting performance-oriented goals. Efficiency, competence, and output become the motivating 
force behind policy. In that sense, specific structural changes that occur are incidental to 
adopting the performance goals. For this reason, the German case dispels the idea that 
deregulation implies anything specific of a structural nature. Structure follows the material 
dictates of technology, productivity, administrative domain, and marketability. 
 
The new regulatory structure manifests a new ideology, new strategic aims of the main 
participants, new instruments to be deployed, and new policy making/options coalitions. This 
changed environment (of which the telecommunications field is one example) represents a 
significant departure from some of the traditional assumptions regarding German politics. For 
example, there is a remarkable lack of corporatist intermediation in the new telecommunications 
regime. There has also been a radical departure from the substantive political value of 
decentralization as a dominating feature of German politics. The development of a new policy 
regime has resulted in the generation of new policy networks. While up to the late 1970s, the 
closed policy network had some features of corporatism, the policy network in the 1980s has 
become fragmented with a plurality of organized and unorganized actors. This new network is 
broadly politicized in both public and private broadcasting. Furthermore, this politicization is not 
balanced by parliamentary means, but largely amounts to back-room influence peddling. The 
number of local and regional broadcasting units is steadily increasing, but these new actors are 
confronted with a complex regulatory structure. Besides the old laws and regulations, a whole 
new body of broadcasting law (solely oriented towards new broadcasting corporations) has been 
developed. But on the regulatory level, the initiative is with the federal government. It still 
strengthens its position as policy initiator and implementer. In the long run, the regulatory 
powers of the states will be further weakened. 
 
Deregulation never meant an end to regulation, but a different regulatory structure. From the 
market's perspective, this new structure should be more permeable and open to competition. But 
to suggest that it "must" be less hierarchical, less command-based, and more flexible is to fall 
victim to the rhetoric of deregulation, not reality. The significant changes in the role of the 
market that are taking place in telecommunications are not founded simply on ideological shifts 
and a newfound faith in the so-called "free market," not even in the US. 
 
Every change carries both anticipated and unanticipated outcomes. Such will be the case in 
Germany. Entertainment and market share constitute fundamentally different norms around 
which to organize and develop programming. To put it simply, the logic governing market 
programming must cause it to seek out the consumer on his/her level. This is a strategy that 
descends rather than ascends. There can be little doubt that German culture will change as a 
result of this process. The future will judge whether this change was for the better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Burgelman, J. (1986). 'The Future of Public Service Broadcasting: A Case Study for a 'New' 
Communications Policy," pp. 173-201 in European Journal of Communication, Vol. I. 
Dyson, K. and P. Humphreys (1989). "Deregulating Broadcasting: The Western European 
Experience," pp. 137-154 in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 17. 
Glotz, P. and R. Kopp (eds.) (1987). Das Ringen um den Medienstaatsvertrag der Länder 
(Struggles Over the State Media Controls in the German Länder ). Berlin, FRG: Spiess. 
Hancher, L. and M. Moran (1989). "Introduction - Regulation and Deregulation," pp. 129-136 in 
European Journalof Political Research, Vol. 17. 
Hauch-Fleck, M. (June 12, 1992). "Marionetten der Macht" (Puppets of Power), 
 p. 29 in Die Zeit. 
Holzer, H. (1985). "The Politics of Telecommunication in the Federal Republic 
 of Germany," pp. 85-1 I I in Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 7. 
Kleinsteuber, H., D. McQuail, and K. Siune (eds.) (1986). Electronic Media and 
 Politics in Western Europe. Euromedia Research Group Handbook of 
 National Systems. Frankfurt am Main, FRG: Frankfurt Campus Publishers. 
Luhmann, N. (1969). Legitimation durch Veifahren (Legitimation through 
 Process). Neuwied, FRG: Luchterhand. 
Lyotard, J. (1984). The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
 Minnesota Press. 
Scharpf, F. (1976). "Theorie der Politikverflechtung" (Theory of Political Interconnectedness), 
pp. 13-70 in F. Scharpf, B. Reissert, and F. Schnabel Politikverflechtung. Theorie und 
Empirie des kooperativen Foederalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Political 
Interconnectedness: Theory and Evidence of Federal Cooperation in the BDR). 
Koenigstein/Ts., FRG: Athenaeum. 
Scherer, J. (1985). Telekommunikationsrecht und Telekommunikationspolitik 
(Telecommunications Law and Politics). Baden Baden, FRG: Nomos.  
 
